Unconditional Probabilistic Theories
Our initial 1 definition of a probabilistic statement is an axiom of the form:
p(A) = t which is taken to mean: "the probability of A is t". Here A is an arbitrary sentence, more precisely a closed wff, in some logical la11guage L (we will use first-order logic in our examples). The value ti s some real number in the closed interval [0,1f This definition has the axiom state a unique value for the unconditional probability of A.
(Note that ordinary "non-probabilistic" logical statements (axioms) are just the special case of certainty;. i.e. the axiom A in usual logic just corresponds to the probabilistic statement: (p(JI.) = 1) .)
Given an initial set K = {(p(A ) = t)} of such ;Jrobabilistic statements (axioms), we induce (entail) a probabilistic theory via probabilistic logic (ct. (14] ). From 1 the set S = {A } of sentences appearing in the statements (along with any other sentences I whose probability we happen to be interested in), we induce, model-theoretically, a closed space W of propositions over which the probabilistic theory is defined. W is the set of equivalence classes of interpretations for the sentences S, i.e. the set of consistent possible worlds corresponding to truth assignments to S 3 .
(Her e consistency may be relative simply to L, or to some "background" (non-probabilistic) theory in L.) This propositional space W has the structure of a propositional logical language, i.e. it is isomorphic to the power set 2tF of a set F of "primitive" propositions. Thus W is isomorphic to the notion of a"frame of discernment" employed in Dempster-Shaler t heory. There F is viewed as a set of distinct "primitive" possibilities 4 •
The initial set of statements K probabilistically entails ((14] ) in general a set of bounded intervals, i.e. inequalities, rather than simply unique values, for the probabilities of the elements of W. The upper-lower probability distribution generalizes both the u�;ual (unique-valued) probability distribution notion, and the Belief function of the Dempster-Shaler theory of evidence. Note that the upper-lower distribution represents explicitly ignorance and partial information (underdeterminationJ. Complete ignorance about the probability of w, is expressed as an interval (0,1 )6.
We would like to regard the upper-lower distribution on W, which we will call P2(W), as a set of concluded (entailed) probabilistic statements (axioms), just like K. This motivates a more general definition of a probabilistic statement as an axiom of the form:
(or alternatively, as of the forms: 
The crux is that we have inequalities and bounded intervals for the probabilities of sentences. Our previous definition is just a special case corresponding to a degenerate interval, i.e. a pair of coinciding bounds.
The more general definition of a probabilistic statement has a nice closure property. If our initial K comprises axioms stating unique values, we in general entail an upper-lower distribution. If our initial K comprises axioms sta ting bounds or intervals, we in general still entail an upper-lower distribution. Thus starting with bounds we in general end with bounds; starting with equalities (un ique values) we in general do no better: we end with bounds rather than simply with equalities.
Another way to view the axioms K is as constraints on the possible candidates for the ordinary (single-valued) probability distribution P(W). Thus we can think of the probabilistic theory as a set of constraints as well as as an upper-lower distribution.
From the perspective of constraints, we may have two kinds of problems in a probabilistic theory: inconsistency, which can arise in the presence of overdetermination; and underdetermination, i.e. intervals too wide for our purposes. A variety of relaxation techniques h ave been proposed or employed to cope with inconsistency, involving both automatic and interactive (interviewing the user) aspects [15, 11) . Underdetennination can only be overcom e by adding more constraints. This means either enlarging K, or adding other sorts of constraints, e.g. various (in)dependence assumptions (we will discuss this more later).
Conditional Probabilistic Theories
We would like also to consider conditional probabilities, so as to represent probabilistic rules, i.e.
"if <antecedent>, with certainty, then <consequent>, with <probability interval>".
We thus generalize yet again our notion of a probabilistic statement, to be an axiom of the form:
where A and B are both sentences in L, and q is a real number in [0,1]. II we view this as a rule, B is the antecedent; and A is the consequent. We will refer to this axiom as a conditional probabilistic inequality; we say it is a CP/(-form) axiom.
Using the definition of conditional probability, the above CPI axiom is equivalent to:
which is an inequality constraint on unconditional probabilities.
An initial set of axioms K of this more general form again entails a probabil istic theory. We can think of unconditional probabilities as a special case of conditional probabilities, where the antecedent is the (trivial) sentence (proposition) "True".
Additional Assumptions As Constraints
We may wish to constrain our probabilistic theory entailed by K, by the use of additional assumptions not expressed as CPI-form axioms. This has commonly been done in AI, in order to ease the task of probabilistic inference, and/or to "flesh out" underdetermined, incomplete, undesirably-partial probabilistic knowledge. We may or may not want to call these assumptions part of our "probabilistic knowledge" in the sense that K is. Often, they are thought of as only invoked in inference. However, since knowledge representation properly includes the reasoning operations on the formal representational structures (in analogy to abstract data types), they do comprise (a perhaps "auxiliary" sort of) probabilistic
knowledge.
An important type of such assumption, employed heavily in PROSPECTOR, is that of conditional independence, i.e. an assumption of the form:
"The propositional subspaces C and_D are statistically independent, conditional on the propositional subspace G."
fo r all C 1 1n C, OJ in D, and Gk 1n G.
We can view Dempster's Rule in Dempster-Shaler theory, as well as the entropy maximization in the Maximum Entropy method, as other types ot assumptions not expressed in CPI form.
Augmented Probabilistic "Logic"
The presence of additional assumptions forces us to adopt a view of probabilistic knowledge which goes beyond probabilisitic logic as discussed above, which we will call "unaugmented" probabilistic logic. More generally what we have is a system of constraints on P(W I W). Those in CPI form comprise K; the others we call collectively D. This system {K & D) "entails" ·(implies) P2(W I W), in the sense of determination by a system of inequalities (including equations). However, unlike in unaugmented probabilistic logic, the entailed P2(W I W) is not equivalent to, i.e. does not fully represent, the whole of the probabilistic knowledge. In unaugmented probabilistic logic P2(W I W) is equivalent to K. Now P2(W I W) is implied by, but
We refer to this more general probabilistic knowledge representation formalism as Augmented Probabilistic "Logic", or A-PL · for short. We will regard the constraints K and D as axioms in our logic 7 . We will be interested in the probabilistic theory T entailed (in the above sense) by these axioms, where T includes P2(W I W). CPI axioms are the traditionally explicit notion of probabilistic knowledge. The augmenting assumptions are traditionally implicit, but there is a duality between the information provided by K and by D: one can su bstitute for the other.
Entailment in A-PL addresses the issues of inconsistency and of underdetermined status, i.e. non-degenerate probability intervals. A-PL makes clear what our probabilistic knowledge is, and in particular what our assumptions are. It separates the question of probabilistic infe renee from the semantics of our probabilistic theory, i.e. probabilistic entailment. We can then ask about the soundness and completeness of our probabilistic inference 8 (more b elow).
Evidence and Confirmation
A considerable body of work in AI has been concerned with aggregating measures of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence for a common set of propositions. On the face of it, this problem may not appear to be compatible with the usual, classical notion of probability. One apparent difficulty is that if we formalize one piece of evidence as:
; and another as:
then we may have an inconsistency, e.g. if r 1 < q 2 . Indeed, some researchers have gone so far as to invent new formalisms and methods, claiming classicnl n probability is inadequate [17,16).
However, we can incorporate some of the leading approaches to (probabilistic reasoning oriented towards) accumulated ev idence and confirmation into the classical framework and our inequality paradigm, if we treat each piece of evidence as conditional on an evidential source (event). Because A-PL confronts explicitly the issue of ignorance and underdetermination , it avoids the problem of obligatory, yet unavailable, probabilistic "priors". 7 For convenience, we will usually omit henceforth the scare quotes from the terms "logic" and " enlailrnenl" in the co,-,toxt of A-PL; however, lhink of them as implicit.
8ot coursol as soon aS wo attack the question of infcrcnco, we need to consider justifications a11d reason mnintenonce (6] .
9somelimes refermd Ia as "tJayesion" after lis us" of tJayas' Rule to combine probabilistic fnfonnnlion 10More precisely, ll1e belief function corresponds to the lower bound for the probability of each membor of H; as we mentioned earlier, this is just equivalent to the upper and lower bounds togethor. Shafer uses !he term "plau�•bility funcllon" for the upper bounds. And so on for E 1 , ... , E n ' i.e. n belief functions, or "pieces" of evidence.
We can think of this as "joint conditioning" since we are generating a new probabilistk (sub-)theory which is conditional on the joint evidence. Thus we represent the accumulation of evidence by augmenting the evidential conditionality of the upper-lower distribution that we are interested in, and by applying some assumptions in order to arrive at an "informative" such P2, i.e. one which is not "vacuous" in the sense of having a bounded interval of [0, 1] for all sentences in W.
Unaugmented probabilistic logic yields a vacuous jointly-conditioned distribution, hence the need for one or more substantive augmenting assumptions as to how to combine evidence from different sources.
The usual, classical, non-"evidential" approach to probabilistic reasoning can be viewed as conditional (trivially) on only one evidential source event. It avoids the issue of joint conditioning.
The Certainty Factors approach to confirmation, pioneered by MYCIN, can also be reformulated in terms of conditional probabilities. Though the MYCIN formalism has some problemB, it can be recast without much violation as isomorphic to probabilities, where the combination of certainty factors CF(H,E I) and CF(H,E2) corresponds to something close to the conditional independence assumption made in PROSPECTOR [5) , as well as to a special case of Dempster's Rule. See [9, 8) for details.
Analytic Application of the Paradigm: Entailment
A common, and in many repects desirable, state of affairs is for our entailed upper-lower distribution P2(W 1 W) to be representable in a more compact, simpler form than is possible in general: for example, as a single-valued probability distribution P1 (WI W); or, as a Dempster-Shaler mass function. If this is the case, we say that our probabilistic theory converges to the simpler representation (i.e. it requires only a special case of our full probabilistic logic.).
In the Maximum Entropy method of probabilistic reasoning. maximization of the entropy of P(W I W) is an augmenting assumption (i.e. part of D) in our probabilistic knowledge. It forces the convergence of the entailed CPI statements to single values. In effect, it is one big, global assumption which adapts flexibly to the other constraints. When examining the entailed CPI statements, however, it is not possible to tell whether a probability was "pinned down" (i.e. determined to have a unique value) by the CPI axioms in K, or instead left completely or partially underdetennined by them. Thus we lose "precision" and "justification" information about the probabilities. By comparinn lhe converged distribution with the P2(W 1 W) entailed in the absence of the maximum entropy assumption, we can make this distinction; we can tell what is the justification for our entailed probabilistic beliefs; and we can understand more clearly the effect, and the meaning in context, of the maximum entropy assumption.
Dempster-Shaler theory has two essential aspects from the point of view of A-PL entailment. One is Dempster's Rule, which we discussed earlier. The other is the axiomatic structure underlying the mass function representation, and thus the equivalent belief function representation as well. While every belie! function is equivalent to an upper-lower distribution, the converse does not hold: not every upper-lower distribution is (representable as. i.e. equivalent to) a Dempster-Siwfer belief function. Indeed, it is quite easy to generate examples of theories in unaugmented probabilistic logic which are not expressible (fully equivalently) in the Dempster-Shaler formalism. One such K is
where A, B, and Care assumt.. >d to form the set F (mutually exclu�;ive and exhaustive) of "primitive" propositions ("singletons"
in Dempster-Shaler terminology).
Thus the Dempster-Shaler belief function includes unique-valued probability as a proper special case, but is in turn included as a proper special case by interval-valued probability. It occupies nuseful middle position in the spectrun1 of representationnl richness and simplicity. This suggests exploiting the Dempster-Shaler representation possibly independently of employing Dempster's Rule. We might want to use some type of assumptions to ensure convergence of a P2 to a belief function 12 • In a similar spirit, we may want to look for restrictions (and perhaps generalizations) of the Dempster-Shaler representation, along with associated convergence mechanisms.
(7] is an interesting example of such an approach.
Indeed, (pure) Dempster·Shafer theory is quite limited in its applicability to probabilistic reasoning in AI because it does not represent rules, i.e. arbitrary conditional pro b abilities. The only type of entailment in Dempster·Shafer is by use of Dempster's Rule, i.e. joint conditioning on the evidential sources of multiple belief functions. Once we understand Dempster·Shafer theory within the framework of A-PL, however, we can sec formally how to marry it to probabilistic rules, and to perform, for example, forward and backward chaining.
Placing Dempster-Shaler theory in the framework of A·PL focuses the epistemological and decision-theoretic issues involved in applying it. The Dempster·Shafer notions of mass and belief are not (or at least, formally, need not be!) an issue beyond that of the use of probability bounds or intervals. The main semantic question is that of Dempster's Rule. So far as this author is aware, Dempster's Rule has resisted a clear intuitive analysis of its underlying assumptions. The correspondenee of
Dempster's Rule in the special case of unique· valued probability to something akin to a conditional independence assumption (8] offers some hope that such an understanding will be forthcoming.
Another, more limited example of a commonly-used assumption is the "fuzzy logic" rule of combination used to entail or infer the probability of a conjunction or a disjunction from the probabilities of the conjuncts or disjuncts. This was employed both in PROSPECTOR and in MYCIN. Formally, it says:
for arbitrary propositions A and B (the conditional form is analogous). This assumption was apparently used because of the perceived need to maintain unique-valued probability. In fact, it corresponds to the assumption of maximal dependency between A and B, i.e. either that p(A!B) = 1 or that p(B!A) = 1. This is both strong and typically unjustified. as well as unsound in general as a rule of inference; its use in PROSPECTOR led to inconsistencies, and PROSPECTOR was accordingly forced to resort on occasion to renormalizing probabilities. If we allow ourselves to use a bounds representation, however, we can use the sound rule(s) of inference:
Thus if we have p(A) = 0.3 and p(B) = 0.5 we can use:
; and 0.5 < p(A VB ) < 1 .
Correlation sign information, employed for example in Greg Cooper's NESTOR [3] , is also naturally represented as an inequality. Negative correlation is represented as an axiom of the form:
positive correlation with the inequality in the other direction. This type of information is often available from qualitative causal knowledge.
Analytic Application of the Paradigm: Inference
Probabilistic inference is typically directed toward the entailed component P2(W I W) of T. It is a process of closure. We start with a data structure representing directly only the CPI axioms in K, i.e. let K = {Ki} where K 1 is the axiom in the canonical form:
In ihe beginning, all other bounds are at the trivial extremes of 0 and 1. By using D as well as the "tautologies" of unaugmented probabilistic logic proper, we proceed to narrow the bounds on probabilities p(W.I W.).
I J
Even if we want to converge ultimately to unique-valued probability, it is useful to think about the intermediate states of inference in terms of bounds. One view of probabilistic inference is as constraint propagation. We can generalize the concept [10] to that of a probabilistic sub -t heory in A-PL, with an associated propositional sub-space of W, as well as a group of axioms, both in CPI for m and otherwise.
Inference consists of applying constraints, but also, in our general scheme, of changing the conditionality on evidence sources. Usually we will not want to explore the whole space (WI W).
Decisions based on probabilistic conclusions are often made by either ranking, i.e. which of several alternatives is more likely or has greatest probabilistically-weighted utility, or by thresholds, i.e. does some alternative have a sufficient probability or probabilistically-weighted utility. Thus bounds will ofte n suffice for deci si on-m ak ing . This may obviate applying, for convergence's sake, strong assumptions which are not justified by our knowledge of the problem domain, and which may even be in conflict (i.e. inconsistent) with that knowledge.
A-PL enables us to take a least-commitment or less-commitment approach to probabilistic reasoning, and allows us to clarify what probabilistic justi f ication constitutes, both in general, and in particular (a problem raised in [6] for example).
Given our newly-developed notions of entailment and inference for p rob abilistic theories in augmented probabilistic logic, we can hope for fruitful insight s into probabilistic reasoning schemes by addressing issues oft raditional concern for ordina r y non-probabilistic logics: foremost soundness and completeness. We defi ne a set of probabilistic inferences as sound iff for each sentence w, the inferred probability interval for w, is a superset of the entailed probability interval for Wr Intuitively, this corresponds to the inference being no "s tronger" than the entailment, where "stronger" means a tighter bound. We dHfine a set of probabilistic inferences as complete iff the inferred probability interval is a subset of the entailed probability interval. Thus sound and complete means the inferred distribution is identical to the entail e d distribution.
Conclusion
We have presented a paradigm of probabilistic knowledge in terms of interval bounds, i.e. inequalities, augmented by additional assumptions (about which we have not said much in general), embodied primarily in the augmented logic of interval -va lueu conditional probability, A-PL. This is a formal, abstract representation, not a practical data st ructure for implementing probabilistic knowledge r epresentation 1 3.
The inequality paradigm lets us represent explicitly the incompleteness of our probabilistic knowledge both "logically", i.e. in
